The end of Airwave and the truth about TETRA and LTE for UK emergency services (Act 2)

ESMCP: A Flawed Process

Politicians, technology and standards

In 2010, the Conservative Party won most votes and seats in the UK General Election, but failed to win an overall majority. The incoming Prime Minister, David Cameron entered into a Coalition Agreement with the Liberal Democrats to form a new Government with a fixed 5-year term until May 2015. The previous Labour Government had reacted to the global financial crisis of 2007/8 by increasing the public debt in an attempt to stimulate the UK economy, so the new Government came into power promising to cut the deficit, mainly by reducing public spending. The Home Office and Cabinet Office quickly identified the Airwave emergency services network as a prime target for cuts. Of course, the private owners thought otherwise believing that the existing, binding contract should be respected as any changes would be detrimental to its fund-holders.

As the Government and Airwave Solutions wrangled over the future of UK emergency services communications, the nationwide TETRA network continued to prove its worth time after time: police reinforcements for the London Riots during summer 2011; a special network extension – Apollo – for the highly successful, safe & secure London Olympics 2012; through the 2012 floods and even more devastating floods of Christmas 2013 that carried on well into 2014; random acts of terror and vandalism, day-to-day policing and call-outs of fire engines, ambulances and rescue teams, the Airwave network always managed to exceed expectations and performance targets, even as commercial mobile network failures increased under the strain of growing traffic and the lack of adequate resilience. However frustratingly expensive the contract might be for the Cameron administration, Airwave’s TETRA network was specially designed to cope with natural & man-made disasters in a world of accelerating climate change and increased geopolitical tensions.

Meanwhile, the global mobile communications revolution followed its course. Global smartphone sales have increased from around 100 million as recently as 2008 up to 1.2 billion in 2014. The slow dial-up Internet connections of the 1990s have been replaced by high-speed broadband connections to the majority of the population. Whole new economies are being created by entrepreneurs congregating in Tech Cities in UK and around the world, all hoping to replicate the success of Silicon Valley. Teenagers send messages, photos and videos across the world in an instant; schoolchildren, businesses, Arab Spring participants, protesters and terrorists all coordinate their actions via social media. And yet the Police are still using old-fashioned, small-screen, painfully slow mobile radios running that “obsolete” TETRA protocol!

Negotiations between the UK Home Office and Airwave were not going well. The Cabinet Office – at the forefront of technological change within Government – had become more actively involved. Ministers under pressure from the Treasury to find cost savings started searching for more cost-effective alternatives to Airwave. A public relations campaign was set up to depict Airwave as safe but slow – clearly the past, not the future. Why did police officers not have access to the kind of modern-day tools – data-rich smartphones - that any ordinary citizen had at his or her disposal? 3G mobile coverage of the UK was admittedly painfully poor, but once the 4G spectrum had been auctioned off, a way could surely be found to encourage the cash-rich, technology-savvy mobile phone operators to develop a solution for the emergency services that could be run – with priority access in times of trouble – over these new super-fast networks. Surely a win-win situation for Government, suppliers, operators and the emergency services themselves who would be equipped with smartphones, video walls for operations, smart watches, virtual reality headsets and whatever else those intelligent TechCity people could think up. Oh, and hopefully starting in 2016, please!

The current state-of-the-art in mobile telephony is LTE (Long Term Evolution), a global standards effort led by 3GPP, which brings together hundreds of the best and brightest brains on the planet to produce technology Releases: a new one approximately every 2 years. Most current, operational LTE networks are based on Releases 8 & 9, although true 4G networks running LTE-Advanced solutions starting at Release 10 are now being deployed in more mature LTE markets such as South Korea and United States, where the majority of customers already have LTE-A enabled devices. LTE has been designed for high-speed data, so voice over LTE will be just another data stream; all voice calls over LTE outside of small pockets of innovation in the aforementioned advanced markets currently still run over the operators’ legacy 2G/3G networks.

A small number of public safety LTE initiatives are in their early stages in Qatar, United States (in particular, the famous First Responder Network Authority aka FirstNet – a project to be discussed in more detail in a future blog) and a few other markets, but all these early projects are based on early-release, commercial LTE equipment supplementing the existing digital mobile radio (TETRA or P25) networks that Governments and operators have committed to maintaining for mission-critical voice and short-data services for many years to come.

Following years of work by Government & non-Government organisations such as NIST/NPSTC (United States), the TETRA + Critical Communications Association, the UK Home Office among many, many others who are too numerous to mention, public safety LTE has moved up the 3GPP agenda and certain features required by emergency services – large-scale group calls, Push-To-Talk, device-to-device, network resilience – have been included in Release 12 and 13 road-maps. A new group within 3GPP, SA6, was established in late 2014 to drive forward standards for the critical communications sector.

After well over 3 years of hard work, inspiration and perspiration by a number of incredibly dedicated, smart people, this work is moving forward, but anyone with experience of standardisation processes knows that there is still a long, long way to go before stable solutions become available and final products reach the hands, heads and bodies of public safety officials on the street and in their autonomous vehicles. The TETRA + Critical Communications Association (TCCA) believes that mission-critical data solutions could be available by 2018 and mission-critical voice by 2020. Let’s hope this is the case.

Back to the United Kingdom and ESMCP…

The UK Government set up the Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP) as a response to the increasingly pressing “what to do about Airwave” problem. The Programme started to gain traction throughout 2012 as a series of public consultations were instigated. The Home Office took the lead, backed up by other relevant Government departments. Ofcom, consultants, technical experts, accountants and lawyers all joined in the consultations, as well as the critical communications industry where a sense of foreboding was already growing regarding the true intentions of a Government determined to cut costs at all costs! ESMCP assembled a core team of some 45 people including representatives of the 3 emergency services to explore how a suitable alternative to Airwave could be found ahead of the existing contracts running out between 2016 and 2020.

The message was to be made clear in all the glossy presentations: Airwave had done a great job of keeping the UK public safe since its inception, but it was now time to move on. Governments in the 21st century could no longer afford to pay for private networks with dedicated spectrum. 4G licences have been auctioned off to the mobile operators with strict coverage plans and strict deadlines for implementation; sleek smartphones are cheaper and have more apps and high-speed data capabilities than bulky, clunky police radios. The path to the future of critical communications is clear for all to see; ESMCP must be on the right side of history; it must be a game-changer; it must lead the world in procuring a state-of-the-art emergency services network fit for the 21st century that will deal with all the problems thrown at it in our modern-day societies. And above all, it will be “Cheaper; Better; Smarter”.

The ESMCP Team developed 4 business cases for the Government to choose from:

• Option 1 - to negotiate a new deal with Airwave or other interested parties to continue operating the existing TETRA network for the foreseeable future, adding advanced data capabilities as required and as they become available.
• Option 2 - to build a new private TETRA network in order to cut Airwave out of the equation and allow the Government to have greater control over future running costs.
• Option 3 – to build a new private LTE network to public safety specifications and using dedicated spectrum to provide a dedicated service to emergency services users.
• Option 4 - to reach an agreement to use additional capacity on the LTE networks being rolled out by commercial mobile network operators, guaranteeing competition and lower price points by separating the implementation into a number of separate components (called Lots) delivered by different organisations, who would compete against each other for Government services and then work together to provide the so-called 4 Cs required by emergency services: capacity, capability, coverage and criticality.

Guess which one was chosen by the UK Government?

The estimated costs of each option were presented at a Cambridge Wireless event during late 2013. The new private LTE network proved to be the most expensive option, surpassing the other three by as much as three billion pounds over the lifetime of the project. Amazingly, the first 2 TETRA-friendly options had almost exactly the same cost – still an astronomical £4.7-4.8 billion – if we are to believe the results of the model developed by ESMCP. Quixoticity estimates for both TETRA options, based on realistic assumptions and data from the critical communications industry, come in much, much cheaper than this.

In the case of Option 1, the TETRA network has already been built, maintained and upgraded by Airwave Solutions to a sufficient degree to manage major riots in London, the London Olympics, New Year’s Day celebrations and major incidents around the country, so this option clearly involves the least investment and the least amount of risk of all 4 options. Even taking the case of Option 2 where a new TETRA network has to be built, the prices of TETRA infrastructure, base stations and hand-held and mobile terminals have all come down noticeably in recent years allowing European governments recently to re-negotiate TETRA network upgrades at a fraction of the cost of their original deployments. Is the ESMCP team really claiming that they or other Government negotiators would be so incompetent or negligent when negotiating taxpayers’ money to allow such a high price to be paid?

As you have probably guessed by now, given the Coalition Government’s determination to reduce the public sector to its bare bones and create incentives for private enterprise to pick up the slack, the ESMCP team found that Option 4 was approximately one billion pounds less than Options 1 & 2. Even though TETRA is a tried & tested technology that is still fully functional & being supplied for a fraction of the cost of Airwave across Europe; and commercial LTE networks are still in the process of being built out across the UK and the standards for public safety LTE have not yet been developed, the “risk-adjusted, fully-costed” Option 4 still managed to emerge from this nebulous analysis as the best option.

It would be interesting to know how much risk, uncertainty and sensitivity to challenging scenarios had been factored into the ESMCP business model analysis and how much they expect local authorities and the emergency services themselves to finance all the additional services currently provided by Airwave that cannot be expected to be provided by profit-maximizing commercial LTE providers and will have to be procured separately – i.e. airborne communications, air-to-ground, ruggedized devices, control room upgrades, end-to-end encryption, additional backhaul bandwidth etc. etc.

An “ambitious (or reckless) timetable”

So we move forward to 2014 with the clock ticking away on the Coalition Government’s plans with a General Election less than 18 months away. The Government chose a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) once again – this time, an elaborate, complex National Programme for IT (NPfIT) contract similar to the one used for a disastrous, expensive, aborted, multi-billion-pound project to provide the National Health Service with a new IT system. In February, a Prior Information Notice (PIN) was placed in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) setting the wheels in motion on the Emergency Services Network (ESN) runaway train - with no brakes and no buffers at the end of the line.

In order to boost competition and reduce costs as far as possible, the ESN contract was divided up into 4 mutually-exclusive but intimately connected Lots, as follows:

• Lot 1 – Delivery Partner (DP) – overall project management switching over the existing solution to the new one
• Lot 2 – User Services (US) – a systems integrator role installing and operating infrastructure and applications, and making sure everything works
• Lot 3 – Mobile Services (MS) – providing a mobile network fit for emergency services satisfying all their requirements
• Lot 4 – Extension Services (ES) – providing extended coverage of the UK land-mass currently covered by TETRA but not by the commercial operators.

The contracts for the lots would run for a mere 5-7 years this time with the possibility of short extensions, with the exception of Lot 4 (where an 8-year extension would be accepted because of the worry that no private enterprise would otherwise want to bid for it). All four lots should be provided at an initial total cost of around £1 billion, with Lots 3 and 4 being the most lucrative, but also the most onerous concerning terms & conditions. As the final, existing Airwave contracts only run out in 2020, these new ESN contracts will focus mainly on the initial build-out of the new service, as most of the shorter-term contracts will need to be awarded again around 2020-2021. Having potentially competed against each other in an earlier stage, the winners of the 4 lots will also have to coordinate their delivery times after signing their contracts. If one contractor is delayed, all the contractors could potentially be penalised.

It is also clear that in order to get off the ground in the first place, the new Emergency Services Network (ESN) will have to provide at least the same level of service or better for around 250,000 operational staff in the 3 emergency services – Police, Fire & Ambulance – as well as the National Crime Agency, National Police Air Services, British Transport Police, Ministry of Defence Police, Civil Nuclear Constabulary and perhaps as many as another 50,000 users from as many as 400 Tier 2 agencies including local Government, a number of charitable bodies and other support services.

This makes the ESN a high-risk undertaking for commercial mobile operators who have previously made their returns on investment by focusing on best-effort mobile services for the general public and business customers. New onerous conditions placed in their contracts by Government to protect emergency services users are almost impossible for accountants and finance directors to quantify. This places enormous – incalculable - technical, financial and reputational risks on the broad shoulders of commercial enterprises, their financiers and shareholders, as if (when) there is an unexpected catastrophic failure of the network, there will be plenty of lawyers, politicians and civil groups looking for someone to blame. If the Government reduces Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to make them more palatable and affordable for commercial players, then it will be the Minister responsible at the time who will be front and centre in a future Public Inquiry.

Government, the ESMCP team and bidders worked frantically over the following months to prepare, present and process the initial bids subject to a strict timetable in order to avoid delays in the following stages. As early as July 2014, at the start of the summer holidays, the Government triumphantly announced 5 bidders for each Lot. The incumbent, Airwave Solutions was bidding for Lots 2, 3 and 4. For the key Lot 3, it was joined by the mobile network operators, EE, Telefonica O2, Vodafone and UK Broadband Networks. Arqiva replaced UK Broadband Networks in the list for Lot 4. It was announced that the evaluation of bids would be completed by late 2014, allowing contracts to be awarded around May 2015 (the date of the General Election) so that the new ESN could be up and running by end 2016, following extensive and exhaustive tests.

The current state of play

So, what is the current status of the project, less than three months before the UK General Election and as the crucial day approaches when final decisions will have to be made and contracts signed?

Since last summer, we have started to witness the first major cracks appearing in the ESN process, due to the over-ambitious time-table set by the Government to fit in with political and legal deadlines created by an immovable General Election and contract renewals; rather than following the more sensible technology standards road-map and guaranteeing the best deal for emergency services staff and taxpayers. After exhaustive (exhausting) negotiations, four of the five bidders for that tricky Lot 4 pulled out leaving only Arqiva standing. Lot 4 was therefore promptly cancelled and combined with Lot 3, adding even greater risks to the business cases of the remaining bidders for the mobile network service - unless some of these risks are transferred to the public sector.

Then, just last week, it was announced that only 2 bidders each remained in the running for Lot 2 (HP Enterprises and the ailing Motorola Solutions) and Lot 3 (Telefonica O2 and the soon-to-be-part-of-BT, EE). Airwave Solutions was no longer in the process, signalling the Government’s clear intentions to run down the TETRA network and move to LTE as quickly as possible; unless the wheel of fortune turns a full circle and BT shows some nostalgia for the ghost of TETRA past and welcomes back Airwave!

So, the only runners left in the ESN race are those mobile network operators who are still in the middle of rolling out their 4G networks while their executives dedicate most of their time to the dramatic takeovers and mergers taking place in the UK mobile landscape – under these circumstances, how much time can they really be expected to dedicate to fulfilling the tight UK ESN timetable? Significant concessions will need to be made on both sides that will either ease the SLA pressure on mobile operators or increase the cost of ESN for taxpayers. Successful bidders for all 3 Lots will also not be paid until the ESN is up and running and fully accepted by the public safety community, making the situation even more uncertain. State Aid investigations could also be added to the mix if Government and winning bidders are not careful with the small print.

The Government response has been to carry on regardless with the customary, politically-correct positive messages. Sound bites uttered recently in the press by the Minister for Security and Immigration, James Brokenshire, included “intense competition”, “impressive technical bids”, “significant cost savings” and “best in the world”. Cabinet Office Minister, Francis Maude also commented on the importance of opening up more Government business to the private sector, allowing strong competition and delivering vital public services at significantly less cost to the taxpayer. It is my firm belief that such optimistic pronouncements are far from certain to be borne out by future events.

The ESMCP Technical Lead, Cate Walton, in an update on ESMCP presented at a British APCO event back in late 2013 had already pointed out the key risks to a successful completion of the project: slow decision-making; commercial failure; late technology and a late transition. All of these potential risks had been assessed and contingency plans put in place, but can fundamental systemic risk ever be eliminated even by the most careful planning when the fundamental framework is flawed?

As the recent and still painful financial crisis has demonstrated, when multiple factors fail simultaneously, as they do when there is a catastrophic failure, - the very scenario that demands an ESN in the first place -, there is a cascade effect that runs through the whole system and threatens its very existence. There is clearly so much that can go wrong. There are so many unknowns – both known unknowns and unknown unknowns! Public safety is not a game; it is not a simple question of cost-benefit analysis, subject to the whims of a particular ideology that the private sector always provides cheaper, better and smarter solutions. Public safety communications is a basic public service that underpins modern societies and allows them to function. Enormous hidden costs are lurking in the background that cannot be tallied on a spreadsheet or specified within a public-private partnership contract. We are potentially throwing out the most secure solution we have before a fit-and-proper replacement is available – a truly scandalous state of affairs.

The UK Government cannot even claim that there are no alternatives to choose from. A growing number of experiences from around the world are being accumulated as more patient Governments consider exactly the same problem and come up with less risky, more sensible and balanced answers. Also, if we allow ourselves a little more time to think things through and let key standardisation processes take their natural course, we may find that interesting new business models become available that the incoming UK Government can consider.

To be continued…